This article presents iALC, an intuitionistic version of the classical description logic ALC, based on the framework for constructive modal logics presented by Simpson [14] and related to description languages, via hybrid logics, by dePaiva [3] . This article corrects and extends the presentation of iALC appearing in [4] . It points out the difference between iALC and the intuitionistic hybrid logic presented in [3] . Completeness and soundness proofs are provided. A brief discussion on the computational complexity of iALC provability is taken. It is worth mentioning that iALC is used to formalize legal knowledge [10, 9, 8, 7] , and in fact, was specifically designed to this goal.
Intuitionistic ALC
The iALC logic is based on the framework for intuitionistic modal logic IK proposed in [14, 5, 13] . These modal logics arise from interpreting the usual possible worlds definitions in an intuitionistic meta-theory. As we will see in the following paragraphs, ideas from [1] were also used, where the framework IHL, for intuitionistic hybrid logics, is introduced. iALC concepts are described as:
where C, D stands for concepts, A for an atomic concept, R for an atomic role. We could have used distinct symbols for subsumption of concepts and the subsumption concept constructor but this would blow-up the calculus presentation. This syntax is more general than standard ALC since it includes subsumption ⊑ as a concept-forming operator. We have no use for nested subsumptions, but they do make the system easier to define, so we keep the general rules. Negation could be defined via subsumption, that is, ¬C = C ⊑ ⊥, but we find it convenient to keep it in the language. The constant ⊤ could also be omitted since it can be represented as ¬⊥.
A constructive interpretation of iALC is a structure I consisting of a nonempty set ∆ I of entities in which each entity represents a partially defined
individual; a refinement pre-ordering I on ∆ I , i.e., a reflexive and transitive relation; and an interpretation function · I mapping each role name R to a binary relation R I ⊆ ∆ I × ∆ I and atomic concept A to a set A I ⊆ ∆ I which is closed under refinement, i.e., x ∈ A I and x I y implies y ∈ A I . The interpretation I is lifted from atomic concepts to arbitrary concepts via:
Following the semantics of IK, the structures I are models for iALC if they satisfy two frame conditions:
The above conditions are diagrammatically expressed as:
Our setting simplifies [11] , since iALC satisfies (like classical ALC) ∃R.⊥ = ⊥ and ∃R.(C ⊔ D) = ∃R.C ⊔ ∃R.D.
Building up from the Simpson's constructive modal logics (called here IML), in [1] , it is introduced intuitionistic hybrid logics, denoted by IHL. Hybrid logics add to usual modal logics a new kind of propositional symbols, the nominals, and also the so-called satisfaction operators. A nominal is assumed to be true at exactly one world, so a nominal can be considered the name of a world. If x is a nominal and X is an arbitrary formula, then a new formula x : X called a satisfaction statement can be formed. The satisfaction statement x : X expresses that the formula X is true at one particular world, namely the world denoted by x. In hindsight one can see that IML shares with hybrid formalisms the idea of making the possible-world semantics part of the deductive system. While IML makes the relationship between worlds (e.g., xRy) part of the deductive system, IHL goes one step further and sees the worlds themselves x, y as part of the deductive system, (as they are now nominals) and the satisfaction relation itself as part of the deductive system, as it is now a syntactic operator, with modalitylike properties. In contrast with the above mentioned approaches, ours assign a truth values to some formulas, also called assertions, they are not concepts as in [1] , for example. Below we define the syntax of general assertions (A) and nominal assertions (N ) for ABOX reasoning in iALC. Formulas (F ) also includes subsumption of concepts interpreted as propositional statements.
where x and y are nominals, R is a role symbol and C is a concept. In particular, this allows x : (y : C), which is a perfectly valid nominal assertion.
Definition 1 (outer nominal)
In a nominal assertion x : γ, x is said to be the outer nominal of this assertion. That is, in an assertion of the form x : (y : γ), x is the outer nominal.
We write I, w |= C to abbreviate w ∈ C I which means that entity w satisfies concept C in the interpretation I 1 . Further, I is a model of C, written I |= C iff ∀w ∈ I.I, w |= C. Finally, |= C means ∀I.I |= C. All previous notions are extended to sets Φ of concepts in the usual universal fashion. Given the hybrid satisfaction statements, the interpretation and semantic satisfaction relation are extended in the expected way. The statement I, w |= x : C holds, if and only if, ∀z x I x . I, z x |= C. In a similar fashion, I, w |= xRy holds ,if and only if,
That is, the evaluation of the hybrid formulas does not take into account only the world w, but it has to be monotonically preserved. It can be observed that for every w ′ , if x I w ′ and I, x ′ |= α, then I, w ′ |= α is a property holding on this satisfaction relation. In common reasoning tasks the interpretation I and the entity w in a verification goal such as I, w |= δ are not given directly but are themselves axiomatized by sets of concepts and formulas. Usually we have a set Θ 2 of formulas and the set Γ of concepts. Accordingly: A Hilbert calculus for iALC is provided following [13, 14, 5] . It consists of all axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic plus the axioms and rules displayed in Figure 1 . The Hilbert calculus implements TBox-reasoning. That is, it decides the semantical relationship Θ, ∅ |= C. Θ has only formulas as members.
A Sequent Calculus for iALC is also provided. The logical rules of the Sequent Calculus for iALC are presented in Figure 2 . The iALC axiomatization the cut rule are omitted but they are as usual. The δ stands for concepts or assertions (x : C or xRy), α and β for concept and R for role. ∆ is a set of formulas. In rules p-∃ and p-∀, the syntax ∀R.∆ means {∀R.α | α ∈ concepts(∆)}, that is, all concepts in ∆ are universal quantified with the same role. The assertions in ∆ are kept unmodified. In the same way, in rule p-N the addition of the nominal is made only in the concepts of ∆ (and in δ if that is a concept) keeping the assertions unmodified. The propositional connectives (⊓, ⊔, ⊑) rules are as usual, the rule ⊔ 2 -r is omitted. The rules are presented without nominals but for each of these rules there is a counterpart with nominals. For example, the rule ⊑-r has one similar:
The main modification comes for the modal rules, which are now role quantification rules. We must keep the intuitionistic constraints for modal operators. Rule ∃-l has the usual condition that y is not in the conclusion. Concerning the usual condition on the ∀-r rule, it is not the case in this system, for the interpretation of the a nominal assertion in a sequent is already implicitly universal (Definition 2). Fig. 2 
Theorem 1 The sequent calculus described in

is sound and complete for TBox reasoning, that is Θ, ∅ |= C if and only if Θ ⇒ C is derivable with the rules of Figure 2.
The completeness of our system is proved relative to the axiomatization of iALC, shown in Figure 1 . The proof is presented in Section 2.
The soundness of the system is proved directly from the semantics of iALC including the ABOX, that is, including nominals. The semantics of a sequent is defined by the satisfaction relation, as shown in Definition 2. The sequent Θ, Γ ⇒ δ is valid if and only if Θ, Γ |= γ. Soundness is proved by showing Figure 2 : The System SC iALC : logical rules that each sequent rule preserves the validity of the sequent and that the initial sequent is valid. This proof is presented in Section 3.
We note that although we have here fixed some inaccuracies in the presentation of the iALC semantics in [4] , the system presented here is basically the same, excepted that here the propositional rules are presented without nominals. Given that, the soundness of the system proved in [4] can be still considered valid without further problems. Note also that the proof of soundness provides in Section 3 is regarded the full language of iALC. It considers nominals and assertion on nominals relationship, that is it concerns ABOX and TBOX. The proof of completeness is for the TBOX only. A proof of completeness for ABOX can be done by the method of canonical models. For the purposes of this article, we choose to show the relative completeness proof with the sake of showing a simpler proof concerning TBOX.
The completeness of SC iALC system
We show the relative completeness of SC iALC regarding the axiomatic presentation of iALC presented in Figure 1 . To prove the completeness of SC iALC it is sufficient to derive in SC iALC the axioms 1-5 of iALC. It is clear that all substitution instances of IPL theorems can also be proved in SC iALC using only propositional rules. The MP rule is a derived rule from the SC iALC using the cut rule. The Nec rule is the p-∀ rule in the system with ∆ empty. In the first two proofs below do not use nominals for given better intuition of the reader about the use of rules with and without nominals.
Axiom 1: 3 Soundness of SC iALC system
In this section we prove that.
Proof: We prove that each sequent rule preserves the validity of the sequent and that the initial sequents are valid. The definition of a valid sequent (Θ, Γ |= γ) is presented in Definition 2.
The validity of the axioms is trivial. We first observe that any application of the rules ⊑-r, ⊑-l,⊓-r,⊓-l, ⊔ 1 -r,⊔ 2 -r, ⊔-l of SC iALC where the sequents do not have any nominal, neither in Θ nor in Γ, is sound regarded intuitionistic propositional logic kripke semantics, to which the validity definition above collapses whenever there is no nominal in the sequents. Thus, in this proof we concentrate in the case where there are nominals. We first observe that the nominal version of ⊑-r, the validity of the premises includes ∀(N om(Γ, δ)).∀ z N om(Γ, δ).(I, z |= Γ ⇒ I, z |= δ)
This means that Γ holds in any worlds z x for the vector x of nominals occurring in Γ. This includes the outer nominal x i in δ (if any). In this case the semantics of ⊑ is preserved, since z includes z i x i . With the sake of a more detailed analysis, we consider the following instance:
x : α 1 , y : α 2 ⇒ x : β ⊑-r α 1 ⇒ x : α 2 ⊑ β Consider an iALC structure I = U, , R I . . . , C I In this case, for any I and any z 1 , z 2 ∈ U I if z 1 x I , z 1 y I , such that, I, z i |= α 1 and I, z i |= α 2 , we have that I, z i |= x : β, since the premise is valid, by hypothesis. In this case, by the semantics of ⊑ we have I, z i |= x : α 1 ⊑ β. The conclusion of the rule is valid too.
The argument shown above for the ⊑-r rule is analogous for the nominal versions of ⊑-r, ⊑-l,⊓-r,⊓-l, ⊔ 1 -r,⊔ 2 -r, ⊔-l. Consider the rule ∀-r.
